Curriculum Objectives - The Aims, Ends or Objectives of the Enterprise - Economics Assignment Help

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Introduction 
The last two chapters have brought to the fall adequately planned educational practice mus is the inescapable matter of determining somehow the aims, ends or objectives of the enterprise is the crucial point that if we examine carefully the character of the central objectives sought by progressives, we find that they, as much as those sought by traditionalists, are necessarily related to the acquisition of certain fundamental forms of w As has already been indicated it is not the purpose of this boo to pursue the first of these demands further. That education sites decisions of this kind is a philosophical point. The aa decisions themselves are, however, not properly made by attending- ing to philosophical considerations only. Psychological, social, economic and other factors are equally important. Yet the relevant philosophical considerations are precisely our concern and the second demand that has emerged is of this kind. Its significance will, therefore, now be pursued further within the more specific context of curriculum planning. 

1 Curriculum objectives 
a The need for o We shall take the term ‘curriculum’ to be the label for a programme or course of activities which is explicitly organized as the means whereby pupils may attain the objectives de whatever these may be. In keeping with the earlier 

THE CURRICULUM curriculum activities can be explicitly directed. Such specification is far from easy and, as yet, no universal categories in which to carry it out are agreed. The celebrated Taxonomy of Educational Objectives by B. S. Bloom and his colleagues, two volumes of which have so far appeared, is an important first attempt at a comprehensive scheme. It divides the whole area into cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains, endeavouring to list classes of detailed objectives that might be pursued in each. In the cognitive domain, for instance, the categorization lists knowledge of specific items of information, of terminologies, conventions, classifications and generalizations. Different types of intellectual abilities and skills are distinguished. In the affective domain, there are, for instance, classes of different types of dispositions to respond, ranging from mere acquiescence to enjoyment, and classes of types of valuing. But valuable though this attempt may be in certain respects, it shows no awareness of the fundamental, necessary relationships between the various kinds of objectives that can be distinguished. A knowledge of the meaning of terms can certainly be thought of as in a different category from a knowledge of empirical facts or an acceptance of a rule of behaviour. But clearly, in any given case, an achievement in one of these categories might be interrelated, even necessarily, with achievements in the others. Much know- ledge of facts about, say, the weather, presupposes a knowledge of the meaning of appropriate terms; and accepting certain rules of behaviour might be justifiable only on a basis of such facts. Thus when it comes to deciding the curriculum objectives which we wish to pursue, we cannot behave as though they are independent elements that can even be characterized, let alone achieved, in isolation from each other. And to say this is but to put in another form what has been argued in Ch. 3 about the nature of those desirable states of mind with which education in its specific sense is centrally concerned, that fundamental to all these, are those distinct, public modes of experience and knowledge which man has now achieved. What we need for satisfactory curriculum plan- ning, then, is a grasp of the structure or pattern of relationships there is between the objectives in which we are interested. Map- ping objectives in this way is an immensely complex philosophical task demanding much detailed analytical work in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Little of this has as yet been done. Yet from the work there is, one or two tentative general conclusions can be drawn about this structure that are clearly of great importance for curriculum decisions. It has been argued that underlying all the more sophisticated objectives such as autonomy, creativeness and critical thought, there must necessarily be the achievements of objective experience, 

THE CU RRIC ULU M knowledge and understanding. If this is so it suggests that the logi- cally most fundamental objectives of all are those of a cognitive kind, on the basis of which, out of which, or in relation to which, all others must be developed. For only in so far as one has the relevant knowledge and forms of reasoning can a person be creative or critical in, say, atomic physics. Only in so far as one under- stands other people can one come to care about them and actively seek their good. Enjoying and valuing the arts is impossible with- out the concepts that make aesthetic experience available. The fundamental structure of the objectives would therefore seem to be within the domain of objective experience and knowledge. If we can map the relationships of achievements here, there is hope that we might eventually progress to a grasp of the more complex pattern of the elements built on these. What, then, are the basic achievements that are necessary to objective experience and know- ledge and what structure does there seem to be within this domain?
 
b Modes of knowledge and experience Let us begin by noting that there can be no experience or knowledge without the acquisi- tion of the relevant concepts. Further, it is only when experience and thought, which necessarily involve the use of concepts of some sort, involve those shared in a public world, that the achievements with which we are concerned are possible. Without shared con- cepts there can be no such distinctions as those between fact and fantasy, truth and error. Only where there is public agreement about the classification and categorization of experience and thought can we hope for any objectivity within them. But merely shared concepts are insufficient for what we mean by objectivity. Connected with these concepts must be objective tests for what it is claimed is experienced, known or understood. Such tests are perhaps best exemplified by the tests of observation in the sciences, though there would seem to be no good reason for considering science to be the only objective pursuit. The crucial point is that, though objective judgments are not possible without a body of agreed concepts, the judgments themselves are not matters of further agreement. It is only because we agree on the meanings of the words employed that we can understand the claim that over five million people live in the Greater London area. Whether or not that claim is true is, however, not a matter of further agreement, but of objective test. Any agreement there may be amongst us about this claim is not just a matter of our deciding but is properly thrust on us by what is the case. And that remains true whether we are concerned with what is the case about the world, God, a work of art or a moral action. It is, therefore, only through the mastery of a body of public concepts, with their related objective 

tests, that objective experience and knowledge can be achieved. And if this is so, then the basic structure of objectives we are after must be one within that body of concepts and related tests which man has so far developed. 

In looking for this structure it is not appropriate here to discuss the detail of relations between the particular concepts which we might wish to teach; for we are concerned only with the more general features of these relations that are significant for overall curriculum planning. What we really want to know at this general level is whether the domain of objective experience and knowledge is, for example, one complex body of interrelated concepts, a unity of some sort, a number of similar forms of experience and know- ledge with parallel relations between the concepts in each area, or whether it has some other implicit organization. To answer this question necessitates an examination of the conceptual relations embedded in the many forms of public expression we have and of the serious claims to objective tests that are associated with these. An examination of this scope cannot be undertaken here; for this we must refer the reader elsewhere. Much of the work in this area is controversial, yet it seems to us to indicate a differentiation of modes of experience and knowledge that are fundamentally different in character.
 
Detailed studies suggest that some seven areas can be dis- tinguished, each of which necessarily involves the use of concepts of a particular kind and a distinctive type of test for its objective claims. The truths of formal logic and mathematics involve con- cepts that pick out relations of a general abstract kind, where deducibility within an axiom system is the particular test for truth. The physical sciences, on the other hand, are concerned with truths that, in the last analysis, stand or fall by the tests of observa- tion by the senses. Abstract though the theoretical concepts they employ may be, the sciences necessarily employ concepts for what is seen, heard, felt, touched or smelt; for it is with an understanding and knowledge of the sensible world that they are concerned. To be clearly distinguished from knowledge and experience of the physical world is our awareness and understanding of our own and other people’s minds. Concepts like those of ‘believing’, ‘deciding’, ‘intending’, ‘wanting’, ‘acting’, ‘hoping’ and ‘enjoying’, which are essential to inter-personal experience and knowledge, do not pick out, in any straightforward way, what is observable by the senses. Indeed the phrase ‘knowledge without observation’ has been coined to make this point. The precise nature of the grounds of our objec- tive judgments in this area is not yet adequately understood, though their irreducibility to other types of test can perhaps be most readily seen in judgments of our own states of mind. Moral judg-63 

in their turn, another family of concepts such as ‘ought’, ‘wrong’ and ‘duty’. Unless actions or states are understood in such terms, it is not their moral character of which we are aware. The claim to objectivity in the case of moral judgments is a matter of long-standing dispute, but the sustained attempts there have been to show the objectivity of morals, and its irreducibility to other forms of knowledge, make this domain one which must be recognized as having serious claims to independ- ent status. Likewise the claims for a distinctive mode of objective aesthetic experience, using forms of symbolic expression not con- fined to the linguistic, must be taken seriously, even though much philosophical work remains to be done here. Religious claims in their traditional forms certainly make use of concepts which, it is now maintained, are irreducible in character. Whether or not there are objective grounds for what is asserted is again a matter on which much more has yet to be said. The case would certainly seem to be one that cannot be simply dismissed. Finally philosophi- cal understanding, as indicated in Ch. 1, would seem to involve unique second order concepts and forms of objective tests irreduc- ible to those of any first order kind.
 
The differentiation of these seven areas is based on the claim that in the last analysis, all our concepts seem to belong to one of a number of distinct, if related, categories which philosophical analysis is concerned to clarify. These categories are marked out in each case by certain fundamental, ultimate or categoreal concepts of a most general kind which other concepts in the category pre- suppose. It will be remembered that the difference between the ‘form’ and ‘content’ of experience was held, in Ch. 3, to be of crucial importance in giving an account of the development of modes of experience. It is these categoreal concepts that provide the form of experience in the different modes. Our understanding of the physical world, for instance, involves such categoreal con- cepts as those of ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘cause’. Concepts such as those of ‘acid’, ‘electron’ and ‘velocity’, all presuppose these categoreal notions. In the religious domain, the concept of ‘God’ or ‘the trans- cendent’ is presumably categoreal whereas the concept of ‘prayer’ operates at a lower level. In the moral area the term ‘ought’ labels a concept of categoreal status, as the term ‘intention’ would seem to do in our understanding of persons. The distinctive type of objective test that is necessary to each domain is clearly linked with the meaning of these categoreal terms, though the specific forms the tests take may depend on the lower level concepts employed. This can be seen especially in the different sciences, different tests all presupposing the same categoreal notions. The division of modes of experience and knowledge suggested 

here is thus a fundamental categoreal division, based on the range of such irreducible categories which we at present seem to have. That other domains might, in due course, come to be distinguished, is in no sense being prejudged; for the history of human conscious- ness would seem to be one of progressive differentiation. The categorization that is at present being suggested may in fact be inaccurate in detail. Be that as it may. What we are suggesting is that within the domain of objective experience and knowledge, there are such radical differences of kind that experience and know- ledge of one form is neither equatable with, nor reducible to, that of any other form. In each case it is only by a grasp of the appropriate concepts and tests that experience and knowledge of that kind be- come available to the individual. Achievements in one domain must be recognized as radically different from those in any other. What is more, within any one domain the concepts used, and the objective claims made, form a particular network of relations. In some cases concepts are tightly connected in a pattern of necessary dependence. In others the relations are more complex and difficult to specify. The forms of justification likewise differ. Thus the concepts and claims of the domain can only be grasped in their varied relations to each other. 

But the radical independence which each of these modes has in relation to the others, is only one aspect of the situation. What is also important is the pattern of interrelationships between them. On a moment’s reflection it can immediately be seen that, how- ever independent the domain of science may be, our understanding of the physical world is tightly dependent on our mathematical knowledge. It is also a commonplace that scientific discoveries in- volve us in new moral dilemmas. Equally some religious claims presuppose historical truths, whilst others demand moral under- standing. Yet these interrelations must not be thought to weaken in any way the claims for independence made above. That experi- ence or knowledge in one domain is necessary to that of another in no way implies that it is sufficient. Of itself no amount of mathe- matical knowledge is sufficient for solving a scientific problem, nor is science alone able to provide moral understanding. What we must recognize is that the development of knowledge and experi- ence in one domain may be impossible without the use of elements of understanding and awareness from some other. But even when incorporated into another domain these elements retain their own unique character and validity. The observable features of an event remain such, no matter what religious interpretation may be offered of it. That an appeal to certain empirical facts may be necessary to justifying a moral principle means that there is a scientific prerequisite for moral understanding in this case. But that pre-65 

The selection of objectives The fundamental structural rela- tions, which have been briefly sketched, have numerous implications for the choice of educational objectives to be served by a curricu- lum. stood 1 
Foremost as among these is the fact that, if education is under- developing desirable states of mind characterized by knowledge and understanding, we must decide with which of the several fundamentally different types of knowledge and under- standing we are concerned. To educate a person significantly in some of these only is to limit the forms of his development which we are prepared systematically to pursue. The issue of breadth in education as opposed to narrow specialization is, if faced properly, surely the issue of whether or not a person is being significantly introduced to each of the fundamentally different types of object- ive experience and knowledge that are open to men. Not to try to introduce pupils to certain areas, or to give up too soon when the going becomes hard, is to accept that in these areas the individual shall, as far as the school is concerned, develop no further. Admit- tedly what can be achieved in any area is a matter of degree. Yet experience would suggest that, only after sustained attention to the relevant concepts, the patterns of reasoning and tests for judg- ment peculiar to any domain, do these elements of thought function spontaneously in a clear and coherent way. It is therefore not sur- prising that there is a persistent call that general education shall be maintained for all throughout the secondary school stage. 

The adequate development of general education has not only suffered from a lack of clarity about the range of understanding and knowledge it should pursue. It has also suffered from a failure to distinguish between the precise objectives of general education and those of special education within the same domain of know- ledge and experience. A budding specialist needs a detailed know- ledge of all the relevant concepts, skills and tests for truth that will progressively provide him with a comprehensive understanding within a given domain. In this area his knowledge and experience 

A general education, however, aims at no such exhaustive mastery. Its concern is that the pupil will be sufficiently immersed in each form of understanding to appreciate its character, to employ its major elements that have application within the con- text of everyday life, and to be aware of the further possibilities in each area, given the time and inclination to pursue these. Clearly there can be an endless variety of courses in any area, the concern of which is a blend of these two. What we need, however, is un- doubtedly the working out of the detailed objectives for courses say in English literature, which are appropriate on the one hand for the sixteen-year-old school leaver of average ability, and on the other for the sixteen-year-old ‘O’ Level candidate who may or may not be going to specialize further in this domain. Equally we need them for the eighteen-year-old entrant to engineering studies at a polytechnic and for the eighteen-year-old university entrance scholar in English literature. 

We have been at pains to emphasize, on philosophical grounds, the significance for the pupil’s development of choosing certain educational objectives rather than others. By our choice of object- ives we are deciding how far his scientific, aesthetic or religious development is or is not important. In making the choice, how- ever, it must not be forgotten, as was mentioned at the outset, that there are legitimate social demands for specific objectives that intelligent planning cannot ignore. A degree of specialized know- ledge and skill in some limited area may be a necessity for all of us, for the good of the whole community as much as for our own individual good. At the present time, the balance of forms of special- ist training needed in our own society is as yet little more than a matter of speculation. Our choice must also take into account the relevant psychological knowledge we have of human abilities and motivation to learn. Just how far we are, at will, able to deter- mine the pattern of development of any one individual, given our present methods of teaching and upbringing, is a controversial question. Certainly at present not everyone could be turned into a Newton or an Einstein, try as best we might. A rationally defens- ible curriculum must be planned to reach objectives that are defensible and that not only from a philosophical point of view. Philosophy can seek to outline the nature and interrelation of objectives, thus indicating what coherent selection necessitates. It can indicate, too, the significance in human development of certain choices. It cannot go further alone. 

The means-ends model Once granted a set of desired objectives, diverse in their character and complex in their interrelations, the business of curriculum planning becomes the organization of the best means to achieve these ends. Yet expressed in this way the situation is liable to be misunderstood. For though the means/ends model brings out well that, logically, the objectives must be deter- mined before all else, it is often taken to imply that no particular means are logically necessary for reaching the stated ends, and that the ends and the means can be characterized in complete independence of each other. A fountain pen may be the means whereby a certain shape is drawn on a piece of paper, but clearly quite other means could be used, and the shape outlined has no significant connection of a logical sort with the nature of the fountain pen used. But in the case of the curriculum, looked at from one point of view, the means employed may be, and often are, closely interrelated with the ends. Only if one understands how to solve certain types of algebraic equations can problems about planetary motion be solved by Newtonian mechanics. Learn- ing the algebraic techniques can therefore harmlessly be regarded as a means to an understanding of planetary motion. But it is not one of many alternative means here, the best of which could be decided by empirical investigation. A grasp of Newtonian mech- anics logically necessitates an understanding of these equations. The means and the end are here inseparably connected so that the latter is not even characterizable without appeal to the former. Indeed, in many cases the means to certain ultimate objectives can be broken down into the achieving of a series of subordinate but necessary objectives, which may be both valuable objectives in themselves and even logically necessary to the achievement of the ultimate objectives. Up to a point the interrelations between objectives can necessitate a certain sequence within the curriculum. Looked at from another point of view, the means to the curriculum’s objectives consists of a programme of activities specifi- cally selected and organized to bring about the forms of develop- ment that are desired. The distinctive character of these educational activities will be discussed in the next chapter. But of interest at this juncture, because of its close connection with the structure of objectives we have outlined, is the type of units which curriculum organization may involve. 

The nature of school ‘subjects’ Clearly any realistic attempt to achieve objectives of the variety and complexity pursued in modern education, must somehow break the enterprise down into a number 

Traditionally this has been done by organizing the curriculum into so-called school ‘subjects’ such as arithmetic, history, English, R.E., and woodwork. Under each of these headings a limited range of objectives is pur- sued to the exclusion of all others, and activities particularly appro- priate for these ends are planned within each unit. Regular periods of time are usually allotted to these activities according to the importance attached to the objectives in each case. But on what principle are these units constructed? Is there any reason to think that this is the only, or even the best way of organizing learning? It is tempting to try to defend this organization on the ground that it, and it alone, is based on the radical differences which we have been concerned to bring out between distinct independent modes of objective experience and knowledge. On examining a typical list of subjects, however, it is obvious that they do not by any means all pursue a group of objectives within one such mode. Under English, or geography, or R.E. several types of understanding may be sought at once. And this simple fact brings to the fore the important point that curriculum units, whatever their character may be, subject, topic, project or some other, must be seen as units constructed simply for educational purposes. They have no ultim- ate value outside this context. Because our experience and know- ledge is differentiated into a number of distinct forms it does not at all follow that the best way of developing such knowledge and experience is to organize a curriculum in terms of these forms. There may be many psychological factors about learning and motivation which would argue against such a pattern. Social demands on the curriculum may make it desirable to bring to- gether knowledge and understanding from different modes. On philosophical grounds alone, any curriculum composed of subjects, each structured to objectives within one mode, would do scant justice to the complex interrelations between the modes that have already been pointed out. Developing a person’s knowledge and experience necessarily involves developing these in the different modes, but that does not mean that one must concern oneself with each of these separately in isolation from all others. All under- standing of moral problems does not have to be pursued in a con- text devoid of any concern for aesthetic appreciation, just because the two modes are of radically different kinds. The two can indeed both be developed, at least in part, by the use of certain works of English literature. The process of developing different forms of distinct yet inter- related experience and understanding can be likened to building a jigsaw. One procedure with a jigsaw might be to structure the enterprise by attending in turn to patches of different colours;

But there is no necessity to do so. One might equally compose the jigsaw by attending to the outlines of differ- ent objects and characters drawn on the surface, no matter what colours are involved. One might instead, at least in the early stages, begin by placing the pieces that form the outer edges. In fact there are many different systematic procedures for building a jigsaw, all of which, however, result in the same interlocked and structured achievement. The same is true with the curriculum. Quite different types of curriculum unit may be used but, if they are effective, they will all necessarily result in the progressive achievement of the structured set of objectives that are desired. In any effective pro- cedure, just as the coloured patches must necessarily be composed in the jigsaw, so the independent modes of understanding and experience must be built from the necessary interlocking elements in the curriculum. It therefore seems that, though the objectives, in which we are interested, must be seen to be related to each other in a structure of independent modes of experience and knowledge, it is possible to pursue these ends within a variety of curriculum units. Certain units might be devoted to objectives within a single mode, as for instance in the study of arithmetic. Others, as in the case of a subject like geography, or in a project, say on local industry, may be concerned with objectives taken from several different modes. 
Yet if what matters is that the desired objectives be reached in their interrelated structure, though there may be no one universal way of achieving these, it would seem likely that there are some restrictions on the design of effective curriculum units which will spring from the nature of the structure which is to be built. It is, after all, perfectly possible to think of systematic ways of approach- ing a jigsaw which would in fact never succeed in fitting it together. One might, for instance, try to place all the pieces having an area of one square inch first, then move on to those with an area of 1.2 square inches and so on. In curriculum planning one might try to produce units by grouping together objectives in ways that pay no attention to the other objectives with which they are necessarily interrelated. The strength of units devoted to a single mode of experience and knowledge is that they permit systematic attention to be given to the progressive mastery of closely interrelated con- cepts, patterns of reasoning and qualities of mind, by radically restricting the character of the objectives with which they are concerned. Although elements from other modes may be used within such ‘subjects’, the mastery of these is assumed to have been dealt with elsewhere. Such units, of course, stress the independence of the different modes. 

The more well established subjects which are concerned with objectives of more than one mode, as, say, geography or English, have unusually been relatively restricted in the range of modes involved. In recent years, however, there has been pressure for them to extend their interests ever wider. Under the label of English, for instance, it is now not uncommon to find concern for an understanding of other persons and of moral matters, as much as aesthetic and linguistic elements. Such subjects have become important in emphasizing the connections which exist between different independent domains. The problem with them has always been that of developing adequately a mastery of elements within the several quite different types of experience and knowledge concerned, without sustained and systematic atten- tion to these individually. Not surprisingly, when effectively pur- sued, they have repeatedly broken down into the distinct study of different aspects belonging to the various modes involved. This problem becomes acute, if not insuperable, with the topic or pro- ject type of curriculum unit where objectives from many modes are brought together. Where the objectives can be effectively reached by these means, and where the interrelation between those, which the topic or project pursues, is genuine and not artificial, such units have an important function. 

Yet, to be successful, such work necessarily makes vast demands on the knowledge and ability of the teachers involved. In less competent hands, project and topic work can only too easily degenerate into pursuits which, however interesting, have little or no educational value. If the objectives from the different domains are not being adequately related to the structures within each of these, little is likely to be achieved. If the objectives grouped to- gether have no significant relationship to each other, there seems little point to this exercise, which serves only to draw attention away from the necessary interrelations which objectives neces- sarily have within the separate modes. One wonders what is gained by organizing a project on hands concerned with physiology, the conditions of employment of factory hands, and the religious signi- ficance of the laying on of hands. Above all there would seem to be an ever present danger that this form of curriculum organization be allowed to determine what educational objectives it shall serve. A topic or project that provides an excellent way into learning elements within one of the modes, is of no wider educational value if the only elements of other modes with which it is significantly related are either known already, or are of little educational im- portance, or are inappropriate for pupils at this stage. There would seem to be something seriously wrong with any form of education a comment on child-centrism and integrated curriculum 71 

Yet, if a doctrinaire insistence on integrated curriculum units may be seriously miseducative, such units nevertheless would seem to have a crucial place in really adequate curriculum planning. The traditional subject curriculum has, both in complex subjects like geography and general science, and in attempts at keeping in step interrelated subjects like mathematics and physics, at times gone some way to prevent an artificial isolation of certain domains. What it has not been able to do so successfully, however, is adequately to plan for those educational objectives which of their logical nature demand an integrated approach. This is most con- spicuously the case if we think of the demands of adequate educa- tion in the making of practical, and especially moral, judgments. Judgments as to what ought to be done in personal and social affairs can only be validly made on the basis of a great deal of knowledge – of the physical world, of society, of the interests and feelings of other people, of the principles on which objective moral judgment must rest. Even efficiency judgments in everyday life, as well as in technical situations, can demand attention to many different factors. Adequate education in this area thus needs, at the very least, to develop the ability to recognize the relevance of very diverse considerations in these cases, and the ability to bring them together in a responsible practical judgment. These are clearly not easy to develop, but what is of importance in this context is that such education necessarily demands an integration of knowledge and understanding from many of the different domains. This being so, it is hard to see how the use of topics and projects can possibly here be avoided. If, in addition to the making of judgments, the related practical arts and skills for carrying out the decisions are also accepted as objectives, the argument for having both topics and projects in the curriculum would seem to be conclusive. The issue of whether or not a curriculum should be composed solely of independent subjects or of other, integrated units, is thus not simply one of the most effective and efficient means of teach- ing and learning in areas where both approaches are possible. Clearly integrated units, simply by virtue of their complexity, can be the means of much valuable learning of many different kinds and from a motivational point of view may have much to recom- mend them. Yet behind this level of discussion lie considerations of the nature of the objectives being aimed at. Just as it is hard to see how the distinctive character of logically distinct modes of know- ledge and experience can possibly be understood without some separate systematic attention to them, so it is hard to see how, without the use of properly designed integrative units, the complex 

The unfortunate polarization of curriculum debate into an opposition between the traditional’ devotees of subjects and the ‘progressive’ devotees of integration, can here, as elsewhere, be seen to rest, at least in part, on philosophical misunderstandings on both sides. The nature of educational objectives demands that adequate atten- tion be paid to developing systematically the pupil’s grasp of modes of experience and knowledge which are both independent and yet intimately interrelated. To fail to attend to either of these aspects by sheer oversight, or in the name of some ill-considered theory of the unity of knowledge, is to distort the whole enterprise.
 
In discussing the organization of the curriculum we have con- fined ourselves to the nature of the units formed by grouping objectives. Such units would seem to be a practical necessity in all curriculum planning. Just how such units might be employed has not, however, been considered. Traditionally 40–45 minute periods have been allotted to different subjects. Yet clearly it is sometimes possible to do away with such an arrangement, leaving the detailed allocation of time to individual teachers or to indi- vidual pupils. The curriculum units employed in an ’integrated day’ may in fact be as subject structured as those in the most tradi- tional grammar-school curriculum. Changes in curricula are not always quite what they seem at first sight. This is equally true in another respect; for calls for the integration of the curriculum are not infrequently confused with calls for the introduction of new types of learning and teaching activity. Indeed it is important to recognize that, at times, we are asked to accept a quite un- necessary package deal, which links an organization of curriculum units with the introduction of new teaching methods. But whether the units of a curriculum are subjects based on independent modes of experience and knowledge, or subjects concerned with several such modes, or topics of some kind, or combinations of all these, it is equally possible to use the widest variety of modern methods. Team-teaching, individual and group discussion work, the use of teaching machines, films, visits and chalk and talk, these and all others can be used equally with a subject structured curriculum as with any other. In rational curriculum planning questions about the structure of the curriculum must be kept clearly distinct from questions about the best activities and methods to be used. About the latter we have so far said practically nothing. To the distinctive character of educational activities we must now turn our attention.

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